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ARTICLES
OBSCENITY: A COMPROMISE PROPOSAL
By Larry M. Elison* and Gary L. Graham
Restrictions on free speech must be viewed with suspicion; restric-
tions in a system based on a concept of ordered liberty require meaning-
ful guidelines. The following material suggests a new method of attack
based on apparent Supreme Court attitudes, general social attitudes
and the diversity of opinion in our Nation.
From Sir Charles Sedley's self exposure' to Stanley's self indulgence2
the United States Supreme Court has been digging deeper and deeper
into the quagmire of obscenity. The result is near total lack of predict-
ibility. The cause lies in the nature of the subject matter and the
method of attack as well as the number of opinions in each decision.
Two hundred years after an English Court found Sedley guilty
of obscene conduct the U. S. Congress passed its first obscenity law. 3
This law barred obscenity in the mails. In the same decade, the English
Courts formulated a definition of obscenity which was to last many
years. Lord Cockburn, in Regina v. Ilicklin, declared, "I think that the
test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the matter charged
as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to
such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication of this sort
may fall."'4 Ultimately this standard was adopted by the U. S. Courts.
In subsequent decisions much language has been added without
corresponding clarification. Judge Learned Hand suggested that the
term "obscene" should describe the critical point in the compromise
between candor and shame as judged by the community standards. 5
Judge Andrews, in Halsey v. New York Society for the Suppression of
Vice,6 stated that the work must be judged as a whole. Judge Woolsey,
in dealing with the James Joyce novel, Ulysses, 7 said that the material
* Professor of Law, University of Montana Law School.
A.B., Idaho State College; LL.B. University of Utah; S.J.D., Uni-
versity of Michigan;
'The King v. Sir Charles Sedley, 1 Keble 620 (K.B. 1663). Sedley also hurled bot-
tles of 'offensive liquid' from the balcony he exposed himself from. Sir Charles
was fined and imprisoned for a week for these imprudent actions.
2Stanley v. Georgia, 89 S.Ct. 1243 (1969).
'13 STAT 504 (1865). For a short history of the Act see PAUL AND SCHWARTZ,
FEDERAL CENSORSHIP, OBSCENITY IN THE MAILS, New York: The Free Press of
Glencoe, 1961. Pages 17-18.
'L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868) at 371.
'U.S. v. Kennerly, 209 Fed. 119, 121 (1913). Judge Hand, in spite of his dissatis-
faction with the Hicklin test, felt obliged to use it.
6234 N.Y. 1, 136 N.E. 219, 220 (1922). Judge Andrews indicated that even the
Bible might be considered obscene if isolated passages were determinative.
7United States v. "Ulysses", 5 F.Supp. 182, 184 (1933), Aff'd 72 F.2d 706.
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must stir the sexual impulses or lead to sexually impure and lustful
thoughts in the person with average sex instincts.
As the Court became increasingly concerned about the scope and
vitality of First Amendment freedoms new protective shields were
constructed. A unanimous Court held unconstitutional a Michigan stat-
ute which prohibited publishing materials tending to corrupt the morals
of minors." Such a statute would reduce the adult population of the
state to reading only that which would be fitting for children.
The unanimity of the Court was shattered in that same year when
it was faced with the Alberts and Roth cases. Justice Brennan noted
magnanimously that sex was not per se obscene. The new language for
obscenity was 'whether to the average person applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole appeals to prurient interest'."
The Jacobellis case" defined the community standard in the Roth
test as national rather than local.
Finally, in 1966 the Supreme Court edged closer to a new approach,
but without sureness or clarity. In Memoirs of Fanny Hill12 Justice
Brennan qualified Roth by saying that if pandering was present in a
close case, the requirement that the material be utterly without redeeming
social value might be satisfied by taking the panderors' evaluation at
face value. The Ginsburg ease 3 emphasized that, "Where the purveyors'
sole emphasis is on the sexually provocative aspects of his publication,
that fact may be decisive in the determination of obscenity.'
14
In Redrup v. New York,'5 the Court cautiously added to the new
approach, looking to the right of privacy to support their decision.
"In none was there any suggestion of an assault upon the individual
privacy by publication in a manner so obtrusive as to make it impossible
for an unwilling individual to avoid exposure to it."'16
And where does the Supreme Court now stand, Not only is the
area of obscenity without contour but the Court is without a core
of agreement. The individual opinions of the different Justices have
been summarized by Professor Magrath.17
8Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
9Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
'Old. at 489.
"Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
"'A Book v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413, 420 (1966).
'aGinzberg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1963).
11Id. at 470.
-386 U.S. 767 (1967).
161d. at 769.
"Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth, 1966 Sp. Ct. Rev. 7, 56-57.
[Vol. 30
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(1) Justices Black and Douglas: All material is constitutionally
protected except where it can be shown to be so brigaded with illegal
action that it constitutes a clear and present danger to significant
social interests.
(2) Justice Stewart: All material is constitutionally protected at
both the state and local level except hardcore pornography.
(3) Justice Harlan: All material is constitutionally protected at
the federal level except hard-core pornography; material may be
suppressed at the state level if reasonable evidence supports a find-
ing that it is salacious and prurient.
(4) Justices Warren, Brennan, and Fortas: Material may be
suppressed both by the state and the federal governments when
prurient appeal, patent offensiveness, and an utter lack of social
value coalesce; in addition, in close cases evidence that the producer,
or distributor commercially exploited the material so as to emphasize
its pruriency withdraws constitutional protection from otherwise
protected material.
(5) Justices Clark and White: Material may be suppressed if
its dominant appeal taken as a whole is to prurient interest.
Professor Magrath has courteously labeled the efforts of the Su-
preme Court in this realm 'a disaster area'.1 8
Obscenity is enigmatic-the purpose of its regulation is as illeon-
eeived, poorly defined and unsupported as the resulting judicial decisions.
What societal interests do we profess to protect by the regulation of
obscenity? Professor Krislov suggests as the traditional bases for ob-
scenity regulation :1
(1) The prevention of improper sexual behavior;
(2) The promotion and inculcation of desirable moral principles;
(3) The avoidance of public displays that are morally and emo-
tionally reprehensible;
(4) The avoidance of public advocacy of unpopular, often illegal,
sexual behavior.
Lockhart and McClure have classified the rationales supporting
censorship of obscenity as: (1) Sexy thoughts; (2) Overt sexual mis-
behavior; (3) Exploitation of psychosexual tensions; (4) Community
standards; and (5) Pornography. 2 )
Among all of the interests named, the strongest theoretical basis for
censorship would be the prevention of improper overt sexual behavior.
This was the main supporting rationale of the Ilicklin rule2 ' and it is
also part of the support for the Roth test which in modified form is
used as the standard for censorship today. This basis is at best theoreti-
cal because there is no proof that obscenity 'depraves and corrupts'.
2 2
There is no credible empirical proof that obscenity contributes to sexual
111d. at 59.
"Krislov, Frora Ginberg to Ginzberg, 1968 Sp. Ct. Rev. 153, 157.
"-Lockhart & McClure, Why Obscene, Printed in '"To DEPRAVE AND CORRUPT .
E'dited by John Chandos, Great Britain: Association Press, 1962. Each of the
rationale is critically analyzed in the article.
,,The tendency of obscenity to deprave and corrupt was present in the statement of
Hicklin test. See Text accompanying note 4, Sapra.
19691
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crimes. It has been suggested by Justice Douglas that obscenity might
provide a substitute rather than a stimulus for antisocial sexual con-
duct a.2  Again, there is no empirical evidence supporting this suggestion.
One must conclude that the factual causal link between obscenity or
pornography and specific antisocial behavior is too illusory to justify
restrictions on free speech. The only concrete justification is the pre-
vailing attitude that obscene-pornographic materials are per se anti-
social apart from any direct or remote effects.
PRIVACY
"The principle which protects personal writings and any other
production of the intellect or of the emotions, is the right of privacy,
and the law has no new principle to formulate when it extends this
protection to the personal appearence, saying, acts and to personal
relations, domestic or otherwise". 24 The Brandeis-Warren theory of a
'right to be let alone' was based on a series of cases which referred to
doctrines in the nature of a right of privacy.2 5 In the past half century
over 300 right of privacy cases have been decided. 26
As developed, the right of privacy is divided into two distinct seg-
ments: the right against governmental invasion and the right against
private invasion. 27 The most recent and most comprehensive case deal-
ing with protection of the right of privacy from governmental invasion
is the Griswold decision. 28 A Conneticut statute prohibiting the use of
contraceptives was held unconstitutional as an invasion of the right of
privacy. Justice Douglas, writing the opinion, stated, "[T]he First
Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from govern-
mental intrusion." He based the right of privacy on the 'zones of pri-
vacy' which are created by the various constitutional guarantees.2 9 Jus-
tice Goldberg, concurring, said that the right of privacy was one of the
fundemental rights that was protected from governmental interference
by the Ninth Amendment. Also in the Griswold case, Justice Douglas
spoke of the Freedom of Speech;
In other words, the state may not consistently with the spirit
of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available know-
ledge. The right to freedom of speech and press includes, not only
2Stanley v. Georgia, Supra, note 2 at 1249. Particularly footnote 9 and accompanying
text.
'Supra, note 12 at 432.
2]Brandeis & Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L.Rev. 193, 213 (1890).
25d. The language 'the right to be let alone' was later used by the then Justice
Brandeis in Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) in his dissenting opinion.
20WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM, New York: Atheneum (1967) 346.
',The former would, of course, be based on the constitutional limitations on govern-
mental action and the latter would be the tort action based either on the common
law or upon statutory provisions. Both of these areas are currently expanding.
'Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See also, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 656.
Id. at 483-485.
[Vol. 30
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the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right
to receive, the right to read . . . and freedom of inquiry, freedom of
thought, and freedom to teach-indeed freedom of the entire univer-
sity community.'
A recent California 1' decision applied the Griswold right of privacy
to an obscenity case. The defendant was charged and convicted of the
possession of lewd films. He contended that they were not meant to be
sold until they had been edited. The court granted the relief sought
by the defendant. In. doing so the court said "No constitutionally
punishable conduct appears in the case of an individual who prepares
material for his own use or for such personal satisfaction as its creation
affords him." ' 32 The same result was reached in a recent United States
Supreme Court decision.--'
Case law suggests a right of privacy broader than the specific con-
stitutional guarantees and underscores the apparent trend toward a
greater recognition of the right of privacy in today's world. Perhaps
one of the reasons for the expansion of the right is the diminishing
ability of a person to escape from people-masses of people. There are
continual assaults by massive government, massive institutions, and
mass communications. In an increasingly complex society, the quiet
sanctuary of ones home is more psychologically sacred than ever.
The right of privacy in tort law encompasses four separate torts:
(1) Intrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or solitude, or into
his private affairs;
(2) Public disclosure of embarassing private facts about the
plaintiff;
(3) Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the
public eye;
(4) Appropriation, for the defendants advantage, of the plain-
tiffs name or likeness."
Intrusion on the plaintiffs seclusion seems to be an expansion of
the intentional trespass doctrine and is of principal concern in the
development of a tort doctrine of obscenity.
In LaCrone v. Ohio Bell, the court recognizeed the first category
and defined it as follows: "[T]he wrongful intrusion into ones private
activities in such a manner as to outrage or to cause mental suffering,
shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities.""5 The Ohio
court found that the tort consisted of several elements including; the
invasion must be objectionable or offensive to the reasonable man; the
'I1d. at 482.
"lIn re Klor, 51 Cal.Rptr. 903, 415 P.2d 791 (1966).
"Id. at 794.
'Supra, note 2.
'Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal.L.Rev. 383 (1960).
--120 O.A. 129, 201 N.E.2nd 533 (1963).
1969]
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thing intruded on must be private; the interest to be protected is pri-
marily a mental one; and actual damages need not be proven. The
court said that this invasion of privacy was an intentional tort that
was analagous to trespass.
With this definition of the tort and with the elements considered
in its application as given above, it is an easy step to find that this
tort action accrues at any time the home of a person is invaded
by matters which would be offensive to a reasonable man. This, of
course, would not apply to governmental actions such as search and
seizure, where sufficient governmental interests are involved and where
many constitutional safeguards protect the individual. The invasion
by a private person is all that is spoken of here.
Montana,3 6 along with a majority of other states, 7 has recognized
the right of privacy. Some states have based their decisions on statutes
which expressly create the right while other states have found the
right to be of common law origin. Most state decisions are based on
the protection of the right of privacy as enunciated by Brandeis and
Warren. The right of privacy is recognized. The right is expanding.
The right should accrue when one's seclusion is invaded by matter which
would be offensive to a reasonable man.
PROPOSED THEORY
Obscenity control has properly been termed a "constitutional disas-
ter area". The tests applied to determine obscenity have been character-
ized by changing standards and general confusion. Emphasis has been
shifted from the 'badness' of the matter itself to the 'badness' of the
conduct of those who pander it. With this shift in emphasis, it becomes
difficult to determine which particular governmental interest or what
combination of governmental interests support the imposition of criminal
sanctions against the producer or distributor of such materials. With
standards so vague and justification for control so nebulous criminal
law should withdraw from the area of obscenity. The tremendous urge
to make criminal all activity of which we disapprove has already cast
an unrealistic and unnecessary burden on law enforcement. If control
is necessary other methods are preferrable.
Based on the experience of Denmark, censorship is probably un-
justified. It is reported that the abolition of all forms or censorship
there has resulted in a depression in the sales of all obscene materials.
This indicates that personal selectivity begins only when governmental
censorship ends. At a minimum obscenity control should be removed
from criminal law and placed in the field of general social sanction
and tort law.
wWelsh v. Roehm, 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952).
'7PROssER, HANDBOOK OP THE LAW OF TORTS, West Publishing: St. Paul (3rd Ed.
1964) P. 831.
[Vol. 30
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Informal social sanctions have probably existed since the first
obscene publication. Among the informal censors who became well
known for their crusades were Thomnas Bowdler and Anthony Comstock.
Bowdler purged Shakespeare's works while Comstock was engaged in
lobbying for adoption of the first obscenity laws in the United States.A5
Although many individuals have been active in this area, their sphere of
activity is usually limited to the smaller communities. Several organ-
izations have as their goal the suppression of obscenity. Noteable among
these is the National Organization for Decent Literature. 39 After a list
of offensive books has been compiled by these organizations, they exert
pressures on book sales outlets in various ways. If a bookseller refuses
to sell the books that are on the organizations list, he receives a certifi-
cate of compliance. If not, he is threatened with a boycott. Occasionally
the lists that are compiled by these organizations are used by law en-
forcement authorities as the basis for obscenity arrests. Other groups
are active in purging school libraries of obscene and 'offensive' ma-
terials. As long as these groups function within the law and without
the aid of criminal sanctions, they should be allowed to do their duty
as they see it.
Another powerful group of informal censors are advertisers in the
various forms of mass media. When 'offensive' material appears in one
of the newspapers or television programs, an advertiser may withdraw
his support from that medium or program in fear of large scale con-
sumer reprisal. (Unfortunately material may be offensive to the ad-
vertiser because of its political, economic or social commentary quite
apart from any obscenity.) If all criminal sanctions dealing with ob-
scenity were removed there would still be a potent force working to rid
the world of smut.
It is proposed that the only legal action that could be contemplated
in the area of obscenity would be a tort action predicated on the gen-
eral right of privacy. Under the proposed approach there would never be
justification to look for, prosecute, or file civil charges against a man
for producing, creating or possessing any variety of written, recorded
or reproduced materials in the confines of his own home.40 The action
would be based on the right of privacy as discussed by Prosser 4' and
would require a penetration of the zone of privacy of an individual with
matters which are offensive to the local community standard. Four
8'Comstock was said to have destroyed over 50 tons of 'vile' books and nearly 4 million
obscene pictures. Excerpts from his book, Traps for the Young, are set forth in Ap-
pendix I to Justice Douglas's dissenting opinion in Ginzberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629, 656 (1967). See also Paul and Schwartz, Supra, note 3 at 18-30: Al-
pert, Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature, THE FIRST FREEDOM, Chicago: Ameri-
can Library Association, 1960.
"THE FIRST FREEDOM, Supra, note 38 at 133-159.
This is in accord with recent decisions, Stan ey r. Georgia, su pra, note 2; In re
Klor, supra, note 31.
uSupra, note 34.
19691
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elements would be necessary for the action: a (1) negligent (2) pene-
tration of the (3) zone of privacy with (4) offensive matters as deter-
Mined by local community standards. (General damage could be as-
suimied if the proof of the basic elements of the cause of action was
adequate. Special damage would have to be alleged and proved.)
Conceptually the most difficult and perhaps the most important
element in the tort claim would be the delineation of the zone of
privacy. This term was used in the Griswold case, but the limits of the
zone were not specified. Although the cases since Griswold have given
the term some content, most oit' theni have dealt with the invasion of
privacy of an individual by the state rather than by another individual.
42
It would be convenient to retain the criminal definition of the zone of
privacy in the tort field, but not necessary nor necessarily desirable
since the interests involved are substantially different.
Perhaps the best initial approach would be to define the zone
oif privacy as the home and allow for further expansion by the courts
as it appears necessary in the particular ease. This would allow the
courts to vary the zone and would serve to keep the concept of privacy
dynamic. It would give everyone the basic assurance that they would
lie free of unwanted 'offensive' materials in their own home. At the
outset this would be the extent of the protection afforded adults. One
apt area of expansion of the zone might be to unrequested personal
solicitation of adults in public places.
The primary means of intrusion or penetration into the home is by
television, radio, door-to-door printed or verbal solicitation, mail, de-
livered newspapers and telephone calls. Other more exceptional means
niight include mobile public address systems and paraded printed pla-
cards. There would be no need to demand physical trespass, since the
invasion is to one's senses rather than his property.
The penetration of the zone of privacy would have to be by offen-
sive matter. To be offensive, the material would have to offend the
moral sensibilities of an individual rather than his political, economic
or religious values. The definition of offensive matter could be narrowly
or broadly interpreted by the jury based on a local community standard
of morality. This position opts for recognition of a tremendous national
diversity. A national standard certainly would be more practical. The
danger of an overly broad definition of offensive matter. and an un-
manageable variety of standards is minimized, first because of the eliN-
ination of any criminal sanction, and second because such a determina-
tion would not prohibit production, possession or distribution of the
"Stanley, supra, note 2, and Elor, sitpra, note 31, both indicate that the right of
privacy extends at least to the home. In Smayda v. U.S., 252 F.2d 251 (1965)
the court refused to extend the right of privacy to a public toilet where there
were reasonable suspieians that homosexual acts were taking place.
[Vol. 30
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material but would merely prevent the distributor from foisting it upon
the person who prefers to avoid it.
There are three alternatives for characterization of the tort: (1)
Strict liability; (2) Negligent; and (3) Intentional. The strict liability
theory would allow the plaintiff to recover on a showing of the last
three elements of the tort. This theory may act too much to the
detriment of the publishers and distributors. The intentional tort theory
is more in line with the Supreme Court decisions dealing with the re-
quirement of showing scienter. Proving both knowledge of the offen-
siveness of the material and an intent to invade the plaintiff's privacy
would be exceedingly difficult and such requirement would probably
make the proposal unacceptable.4" The flaw in requiring a showing
that the publisher or the distributor knew that the material was offen-
sive and that they intended to invade the privacy of the plaintiff is that a
heavy burden is placed on the individual plaintiff. The middle ground,
negligence, seems on balance to be the most acceptable characterization.
This would require the plaintiff to prove that the defendent knew or
should have known that the material he was distributing was offensive
and that he knew or should have known he was foisting upon uncon-
senting persons.
CLASSIFICATION
Under the proposed theory the zone of privacy of those under the
age of 18 years would be expanded to preclude any exposure to matters
which are offensive to local community standards. The only means by
which this could be accomplished without interfering with an adult's
right to be informed would be through classification which would
assure that matters which are offensive would not be distributed to
children. The basis for this expanded zone of privacy for children is an
assumption that offensive materials will not corrupt adults, but may
corrupt children. While this assumption is not supported or refuted by
existing empirical evidence, moral values of adults are more firmly
rooted and less susceptible to change. Children are still in the process
of developing moral values. Until these moral values are developed,
children may legitimately be considered incapable of dealing, as a
matter of free choice, with materials which are generally deemed offen-
sive.
Prince v. Commonwealth4 4 recognized that the state has an interest in
protecting the welfare of children and in seeing that they are 'safe-
guarded from abuses' which might prevent their 'growth into free, in-
dependent well-developed citizens'. The Ginzberg case 45 held that the
state of New York had the power to prohibit the sale of matter to
minors which could not properly be withheld from adults.
sSnith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
"321 U.S. 158 (1944).
'fGinzberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
1969]
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The Court approved the idea of variable obscenity which seems to
mean judicial approval of classification for morally offensive matters.4
It held that it was not irrational for the New York legislature to find
that exposure to materials which were obscene within the meaning of
the statute was harmful to minors. There seems to be greater unanimity
among the 'experts' (still without much empirical support) that ob-
scenity may be harmful to children and may not be harmful to adults
and therefore classification is a reasonable and legitimate approach."
The determination of what could properly be withheld from children
would not have to he based exclusively on sexual content. If obscenity
can corrupt, so might depietion of violence. Presently there is substan-
tial pressure to reduce the level of violence that is currently the vogue
in children's television programs. Matters which are extremely and un-
necessarily violent might be fairly determined to be morally offensive.
If materials were found to be offensive to children, the distributor would
be allowed to sell or present the material to adults but the material
could not be distributed to children. A finding that particular materials
were offensive would nean that the imaterial could not be made avail-
able to children and could not be foisted upon adults within their home
but could otherwise be miade available to adults. There could never be
and should never be total suppression of any material. h'lis proposal
would entitle an adult to purchase anything that anyone wanted to
take the time to print, draw, photograph or otherwise prepare. To
restrict the adult poliulation to matters which are fit for children would
be to 'burn the whle house to toast the pig.'' 48
Preferably there would be three classifications: adults, 13-18 year
olds, and 12 and under. This would be in line with the Butler 4 9 idea that
you should only prohibit matters which are assumed detrimental to
the particular class. This would mean the development of a three-step
classification in line with the maturing process of the individuals ex-
posed. Even though three categories are recommended, for convenience
it would probably be necessary to use only two. However, even with two
categories an award of special damages would be avaibable which would
consider the particular damage sustained by the plaintiff. Since the
defendent takes the plaintiff as he finds him, special damages could be
enhanced by a showing of special injury as a result of the plaintiff's
chronological, social or moral immaturity.
The proposed classification system would not prevent children from
gaining access to offensive material if the parents decide that the
material is proper for their children. This is in accord with the prin-
10Supra, note 8.
"Supra, note 45.
48Supra, note 22. Also, any work written on obscenity has an opinion one way or the
other concerning the harm if any that results from exposure to obscene materials.
"Supra, note 8.
[Vol..30
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ciple expressed in the Ginzberg case50 that the primary responsibility for
the well-being of the child is in the parents, but that this parental con-
trol cannot exist at all times. The evil that the classification scheme
seeks to prevent is the purchase of offensive material by the young
child without the consent or even the knowledge of the parent. With
a classification scheme in operation, there would be no interference
with the child's right to be informed if it is agreed that at this age he
does not possess the capacity to determine what information he should
be exposed to and that duty falls upon the parents.
And who shall assume the Olympian and tyrannical duty of class-
ification? The rational choice, if there can be a rational choice, is the
person who prepares the material to be disseminated. The publisher or
producer is more intimately acquainted with the contents of the ma-
terial than any other person in a position of control. This scheme of
classification has already found general acceptance in the motion picture
industry.
JUSTIFICATION FOR THE APPROACH
Great confusion exists as to what is obscene today and what may
be termed obscene tomorrow. There is a real need to provide a more
definite standard and to eliminate criminal sanctions. Under the sug-
gested approach, the only sanctions that could be used against a person
are civil sanctions, and if the person properly classifies the material
and then distributes it according to the classification he would avoid
susceptibility to all sanctions.
The suggested tort approach would also do away with the necessity
of the head in the sand approach that free speech guarantees do not
protect obscenity since obscenity is not within the guarantee and that
obscenity is whatever we decide it to be. Such a tautalogical definition
of the limits of free speech is not acceptable. In the hands of a 'moral-
istic' Court it allows limitless repression. The original basis for the
exclusion of obscenity from the free speech guarantee was extremely
weak as pointed out in the dissent by Mr. Justice Douglas to the ma-
jority decision in Memoirs.51 One of the reasons that this theory seems
ludicrous is that since the standards of the community are rapidly
changing, things which were considered obscene a few years ago ar.
now protected under the First Amendment. The material itself didn't
change-only the attitude towards it. To base constitutional protection
on the whim of the community standard seems the height of folly. Any
material, reproduction, object of art or what have you should be avail-
able for purchase by the adult population with the only restriction being
that it cannot be forced upon them.
10Supra, note 45.
"
1Supra, note 12.
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Of all the reasons for the suppression of obscenity, the one
which seems to be the least supportable from a purely statistical be-
haviorial standpoint is the claim that obscenity tends to corrupt the
reader or viewer.5 2  There remains great conflict in this area. The
tendency to corrupt is a segment of the vicious circle used to
justify the present program of censorship. If material has a tendency
to corrupt, it has no redeeming social value. If it does not have
redeeming social value, it is not protected under the First Amend-
nient. Since it is not protected under the First Amiendment, the mere
possibility that it may corrupt is enough to allow suppression. Such
reasoning is illustrative of an approach which permits suppression of
material without proof of its harmful effects. If the statement enun-
ciated the idea that obscenity may corrupt, the rest could not follow
and more has not been proved.
The suggested approach protects legitimate public interest in the
suippression of offensive inaterialsP.5 Adults who wish to be exposed to
offensive material may risk corrupting themselves. This is a minor con-
cession to free speech and to a more practical solution to the problem
of morally offensive material. If obscene materials corrupt, who among
us would risk corruption as a censor? In truth, if there is any validity
in the thesis that obscenity will corrupt, it must be found to be limited
to persons whose moral sensibilities have not matured. Then it would
seem that any proposal which would protect the youth from exposure
to niorally offensive materials would satisfy any legitimate public policy.
Tliat which has been said about the tendency to corrupt is equally appli-
cable to the tendency to trigger improper sexual conduct.
The suggested solution would be an easy move for the courts to
make since they already seem aimed in the proper direction. The Court
has been placing more and more emphasis on pandering, as an invasion
of privacy. The Court has also made direct reference to privacy in
connection with obscenity cases. In the Redrup case 4 the Court Per
Curian stated "In none [of the cases being considered] was there any
suggestion of an assault upon individual privacy by publication in a
manner so obtrusive as to make it impossible for an unwilling individual
to avoid exposure to it." The Court in Stanley, in reference to the dis-
tribution of obscene materials noted the objection as "[T]here is al-
ways the danger that obsene material might fall into the hands of children
. . . or that it might intrude upon the sensibilities or privacy of the
general public. 5 5 Control of offensive material through the use of the
extended right of privacy is but a short step away.
5 2Supra, note 48.
'The Stanley case, supra, note 2, intimated that the two legitimate interests that ob-
scenity regulation protects are isolation of children from the possible effects of ob-
scenity and protection of adults right of privacy.
5 Sn pra, note 15.
5Supra, note 2 at 1249.
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HOW WOULD IT WORK?
Theory applied to the communications media.
Communications most likely to invade a man's castle include tele-
vision, radio, newspapers, unsolicited mail and any form of uninvited
door to door solicitation. To avoid civil litigation such communications
would have to be inoffensive to the community moral standards. If
there are any children in the home and it is reasonable to conclude that
these materials will reach the children because of the time that they are
presented or because of the manner in which they are distributed, they
must conform to the community standards applicable to children. The
general effect of placing the primary zone of privacy in the home might
be to subject any form of communications that invades the home to the
childs standard of scrutiny. This would not be in violation of the ideas
expressed in Butler because this prohibition would only be effective as
to those things which invade the home. An adult could voluntarily
expose himself to anything outside the home. The main reason for
reducing media such as television to programming that would be suit-
able for children is that parents should be given assurance that their
children will be free from offensive matters in their own home. Parents
can hardly be expected to be present at all times to control the materials
that their children arc exposed to on radio and television. This does not
mean that the media will have to program pablum, only that they limit
vivid portrayals of sex and violence. The standard applied to nationally
produced and programmed material could be national. As to local pro-
duction, sales and distribution, the standard could be local.
Once invasion of the home is no longer threatened, a system of
classification would be invoked. If materials which are offensive to the
local community moral standards are made available to children a cause
of action would arise. This should prevent persons from selling or dis-
playing offensive materials in any place where access to the materials
cannot be controlled. In any case where a child was exposed to offen-
sive materials, without parental consent an action could be brought.
The determination of whether the exposure was negligent or could have
been prevented would have to be made by the jury under their deter-
mination of whether the zone of privacy had been penetrated. Materials
which would be considered offensive to children could be displayed and
sold only in areas where the classification scheme could be enforced.
Bookstands
These would require implementation of the classification scheme
previously considered. Any book that was not classified would be con-
sidered fit for sales to minors. The distributors would have the respon-
sibility of separating the books that are expressly classified as being
unfit for consumption by minors from those which are unclassified.
Children under the age of 18 would not be allowed into the area which
1969]
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contained classified books. If a right of action exists both the distributor
and the publisher could be joined. What has been said about the class-
ification of books would apply to all other forms of printed materials,
recordings and photographs.
Theatres
The classification system which the motion pictures are using at
the present time would probably be adequate. If the distributing com-
pany had not classified the film, it would become the responsibility of
the local theatre manager to view and classify it. In this way the
local community standard could be used in the classification. Not only
would the films themselves have to be classified, but also the previews
or trailers. This would be necessary to insure that offensive scenes were
not shown to a general audience when the coming attraction is an adults-
only film. Virtually the same method of classification would apply to
live theatrical presentations. In some respects those would be easier to
classify than movies since the presentation would be more localized
and the local community standard could be readily determined before
hand. However, preview of a live theatrical presentation might prove
objectionable and difficult.
Libraries
These would require the same type of control features as bookstores
discussed above. A separate area would be set aside for the display of
materials which are restricted to adult reading. This would be based
on the publishers classification. Any book that was classified would be
restricted to adult readership. The library would also have the alterna-
tie of allowing only adults to select the books thus giving them the
responsibility of classification in an informal way. This problem may
be illusory since libraries probably have a very limited number of
'obscene' books on their shelves at the present time.
Schools
Since the only materials which would give rise to an action for
invasion of privacy are those which are offensive to the morals of the
community, there would be no problem with most textbooks. The main
foreseeable problem would be sex education programs. The school li-
brary would operate in the same manner as any other library except
that there would probably be no need for them to have any books that
were classified as being unfit for children. By the time most persons
reach university age they would no longer be considered children under
the classification scheme and could voluntarily expose themselves to
any material. Here the important thing would be to ensure that no person
be required to read or view material which would be offensive to objective
moral sensibilities. Thus required reading in required courses would
[Vol. 30
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have to conform to the moral standards of the community.56 If the
course is not required for graduation, the instructor would be required
to list potentially offensive materials prior to registration. An instructor
in a required course could also avoid the invasion of privacy by using
the questionable material as supplementary rather than required reading.
The principal objective with college age persons would be to give them
notice of the questionable nature of the material and then allow them
free choice.
Public Gatherings
Unless an event is held in a location where attendance can be limited
to certain age groups, the person making the presentation would be
limited to presenting matters which would not be offensive to the moral
sensibilities of those present. This follows the general theory that the
zone of privacy of children follows them wherever they are and wherever
they are permitted or encouraged to go.
The above descriptions of the practical applications of the proposed
invasion-of-privacy tort do not pretend to cover all situations but should
provide a basis from which an extrapolation can be made and a conclu-
sion reached that will apply to most situations.
SHORTCOMINGS
The premise that obscenity is not harmful to adults as long as they
have the choice of being exposed to it is probably the point most suscept-
ible to criticism. As has been pointed out previously, there is a wealth of
opinion supporting either side. However, it seems fallacious to base a
restriction of free speech and the freedom to be informed on the tenuous
assumption that obscenity has a tendency to stimulate sexual misbe-
havior. It is against the principles of freedom to treat suspicion as ade-
quate grounds for supression. Neither the courts nor the legislatures
should ever accept such a proposal.
As has been mentioned above, the courts are becoming more privacy
conscious and might be willing, foir the sake of ending the present con-
fusion, to adopt such a theory. In states which consider the right of
privacy a common law right, the courts would be free to develop such
a theory without legislative intervention. Legislation would be needed
to repeal criminal sanctions for the publishing and distribution of ob-
scenity. Where the right of privacy is considered statutory, the entire
adoption of the theory would be in the hands of the legislature. This
would create substantial difficulty since those who are in favor of strict
censorship and severe criminal sanctions are usually the most vocal.
This approach is most compatible with the pedagogical view that required courses
are mostly nonsense and university students should be encouraged to exercise great-
er freedom to learn rather than be poured into pre-determined educational molds.
1969]
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The amount of increased informal censorship that might result from the
adoption of this proposal can not be predetermined. It is generally as-
sumed that when the state ceases to act as a censor, groups of interested
citizens tend to assume that role. Since it is a matter of speculation it
can only be mentioned here as a matter to be considered.
A final difficulty in making the proposal work is the requirement
of classification. There are many dangers inherent in the idea of classifi-
cation. The main fear of classification is that it may act as a prior re-
straint and discourage the production of materials which might be ques-
tionable. Under the theory as presented, this is an idle concern. The
only thing that the classification will affect is the quality of material
that is presented or made available to children. To classify an item as
unfit for children means only that it would give rise to an action for in-
vasion of privacy if it were made available to a child. The conclusion
that a particular matter is obscene will not remove it from the reach
of everyone but will merely restrict it so that it will not fall within the
rech of the group that it is supposed it might harm.
CONCLUSION
Freedom of expression should be a most carefully guarded freedom.
Nevertheless it can be wielded in a number of vicious and destructive
ways. An accused person's right to a fair trial can be destroyed by un-
restrained expression which creates an atmosphere of prejudice. The
damage to the accused is unquestioned-it may cost him his liberty or
his life. Neither the court nor the accused have legal authority to pro-
tect the criminal process from such outside interferences-freedom of
expression is deemed too important! 57
People who speak plain lies about public figures stand protected
unless malice is proved.58 The damage to the individual maligned is un-
questioned. The lies may cost him his job and his reputation but he is
without legal remedy 59-freedom of expression is too important!
By contrast it seems a strange and perverse twist that calls forth
criminal sanctions to limit freedom of expression if it dallies too long
6 lThe judicial system is forced to rely on continuances, changes of venue and rever-
sals to protect the accused and purify its own processes. See Delaney v. United
States, 199 F.2d 107 (lst Cir. 1952); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1965);
State v. Dryman, 127 Mont. 579, 269 P.2d 796 (1954).
8A virtual impossibility. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964);
Beckly Newspapers v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967); Pickering v. Board of Education,
391 U.S. 563 (1968).
59He must rely on public refutation which is perhaps an adequate remedy in a free
society.
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on the subject of sex60 even though there is a serious question as to the
damage that flows therefrom.
In many respects our law is an image of our troubled society. Values
have evolved from political and economic strength and from the strength
of human emotions-not from empirical evidence and reasoned judgment.
G'Supra, notes 1 through 13. Remember, no depiction of violence is too gross to call
forth similar sanctions.
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